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I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant herein appeals his conviction for Misdemeanor Domestic Battery entered
following a court trial on September 7, 2016. In this appeal, Appellant asserts a violation of his
federal and state constitutional rights to a jury trial. Specifically, Appellant contends that
conducting a court trial without first obtaining his personal waiver of his right to a jury trial
violated Article I, section 7 of the Idaho Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.
Appellant requests that his conviction be vacated and that this case be remanded for
further proceedings.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On June 8, 2016, Appellant was charged with Misdemeanor Domestic Battery in
Bingham County, Idaho. (Clerk's Record [C.R.], p. 6). He was arraigned on this charge in front
of Magistrate James Barrett on June 8, 2016. (C.R., p. 21; Supplemental Transcript [S.T.], pp. 410). As part of his arraignment, Appellant filled out and completed the Notification of Rights
form. (C.R., p. 20). Paragraph 4 of this form provides that, "you have the right to a trial before
the Court or a jury of six (6) jurors drawn from the CoUli Jury Panel." Id. Appellant initialed
paragraph 4 and signed it in front of a witness prior to being arraigned in open court by Judge
Barrett.
At his appearance for arraignment in front of Judge Barrett, Appellant was not fllliher
advised by the Court of his constitutional rights, including his right to a jury trial. The only
reference made by Judge Barrett at the arraignment concerning Appellant's rights was as
follows:
Court: "All right. I see you filled out your rights form. Do you have any question
about your rights today?"
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Appellant: "No Sir."
(S.T., p. 4).
The Court then went onto review Appellant's application for a public defender which was
approved. Id.
The initial pretrial conference for Appellant's case was held on July 12, 2016. Pretrial
conferences on misdemeanor cases in Bingham County are conducted off the record. As the
District Court noted on appeal:
"The record does not reflect how Haggard's pretrial was conducted. The custom
in Bingham County, as noted by Haggard, is to hold an informal conference
between the prosecutor, the defendant, and defense counsel, after which a pretrial
stipulation and order is signed by the parties and the presiding magistrate judge. If
issues arise requiring the magistrate's presence, the magistrate is called into the
courtroom and matters are placed on the record." (C.R., p. 109).
This custom was followed in this case. It is undisputed that Appellant never appeared in
front of the magistrate at his pretrial conference. The only thing of record concerning this pretrial
conference is the Pretrial Stipulation and Order which was signed by Appellant, his defense
counsel, and the prosecuting attorney. (C.R., p. 27). It is significant that this document was not
signed by the magistrate judge at the pretrial conference or thereafter. This further supports the
fact that Appellant never appeared before the magistrate at his pretrial conference where he
signed the Pretrial Stipulation. Id.
This Pretrial Stipulation reflects that a court trial was scheduled for September 7, 2016.
This Stipulation also provides that "the right to have this matter heard by a jury trial is waived by
both parties." Id. It also provides above the signature lines, "THE UNDERSIGNED AGREE
THE COURT SHOULD PROCEED AS INDICATED ABOVE, TO INCLUDE WAIVER OF
JURY TRIAL IF SUCH HAS BEEN CHECKED BY BOTH PARTIES." Id. While the Pretrial
Stipulation was signed by Appellant and the attorneys, there was only one check mark in the box
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referencing the court trial being scheduled. Id. It is unclear from the record which patty checked
the box.
A court trial was conducted on September 7, 2016, and the Appellant was found guilty by
the comt. (C.R., pp. 33-34).

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
i. Fundamental Error

Appellant did not file a motion for a new trial nor otherwise raise the issue of a violation
of his right to a jury trial in the district comt. Therefore, in order to obtain relief on appeal,
Appellant must demonstrate fundmnental error. To do so:
"(I) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's
unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error must be clear or
obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in the
appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a
tactical decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error affected
the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that it must have
affected the outcome of the trial proceedings."

State v. Peny, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010).
If the Appellant meets his burden under State v. Perry that the first two prongs are
satisfied, then he is relieved of the burden to show prejudice in the third prong because a
constitutionally invalid waiver of the right to a jury trial is a structural defect that dispels
his obligation to show actual prejudice. State v. Vasquez, 163 Idaho 557,416 P.3d 108,
113 (2018).

ii. Waiver of Jury Trial
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 7 of
the Idaho Constitution both preserve a criminal defendant's right to a jury trial. However,
Article 1, section 7 additionally directs how that right to a jury trial may be waived. It states:
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"The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate ... A trial by jury may be waived in all
criminal cases, by the content of all parties, expressed in open court. ... "
Such constitutional right is consistent with the current Idaho Criminal Rules. Idaho Criminal
Rule 23(b) states:
"Misdemeanor cases. In criminal cases not amounting to a felony, issues of fact
must be tried by a jury, unless a trial by jury is waived by the consent of both
parties expressed in open court and entered in the minutes."
The United States Supreme Court has warned that waiver of the right to a jury trial is not
to be presumed from the silent record. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). State supreme
courts have been more specific and have held that having been "advised" by counsel is not
sufficient to waive a jury trial. In Re: Tahl, l Cal.3d 122 (1969). They have further held that that
a defendant must first be advised by the court of his right to a jury trial and he must personally
waive this right in open court for the record. State v. Irving, 216 Kan. 588 (1975).
Idaho appeals courts have historically observed that because "trial by jury is one of the
fundamental guaranties of the rights and liberties of the people, every reasonable presumption
should be indulged against its waiver." Stale v. Wheeler, 114 Idaho 97, 101, 753 P.2d 833, 838
(Id. App. 1988).
The Idaho Court of Appeals has affirmed these prior decisions and, in State v. Swan, 108
Idaho 963, 703 P.2d 727 (Ct. App. 1985), it adopted the procedure as set forth by the American
Bar Association:
"The Comi shall not accept a waiver unless the defendant, after being advised by the
court of his right to a trial by jury, personally waives his right to trial by jury, either in
writing or in open comi for the record." The American Bar Association Standards/or
Criminal Justice, Vol. III, Ch. 15, Trial by Jury, Section l.2(b)(1980).
After Swan, there is a requirement in Idaho for the comi to address the defendant
personally in open comi: "a requirement that the comi personally address the defendant will not
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constitute an undue burden on the court where this very important right is at issue." Swan, I 08
Idaho at 963, 703 P.2d at 727.
This Court most recently expounded upon Perry and Swan in State v. Vasquez, Id. The
defendant in Vasquez had been charged with a felony. In this Court's analysis of her waiver ofa
jury trial, Idaho Criminal Rules 23(a) required that she waive jury trial "by a written waiver
executed by the defendant in open court. ... " This Court found that there was a procedural error
by the trial court as it failed to obtain "defendant's personal, knowing and voluntary waiver of
her right to jury trial." Id 416 P. 3d at 113. Ms. Vasquez had not executed a written waiver.
However, even if she had done so, the written waiver requirement of Rule 23(a) would not have
been satisfied because, as this Court observed:
"the trial court did not discuss with Vasquez her right to trial by jury, nor did
Vasquez offer any indication that she waived her right in a knowing, voluntary
manner." Id
In Vasquez then, this Court bolstered the Swan requirement that "the court personally
address the defendant" even when, as Rule 23(a) involving waiving jury trial in felony cases
provides, a written waiver executed in open court will suffice.

IV. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Is it reversible error for Appellant's conviction to have been entered where the
Appellant was never personally addressed by the magistrate court regarding his waiver of jury
trial?

V.ARGUMENT
A. A Signed Written Waiver by Appellant is Not Sufficient
i. The Conflict in Swan
On appeal from the magistrate court in this case, the district court highlighted the
conflicting references in Swan.
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On the one hand, Swan quotes the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal
Justice which requires that a defendant "personally waives his right to trial by jury, either in
writing or in open court for the record." State v. Swan, 108 Idaho at 966, 703 P.2d 583. The
district court found that "key here is the Idaho Court of Appeals' use of the disjunctive 'either in
writing or in open court."' (C.T., p, 108). The district court further found that "the word 'or'
indicates two alternatives, distinct from one another." Id.

It concluded that Appellant "could validly waive his right to a jury trial by one of the two
methods; in writing Q!: in open court for the record." Id Because Appellant had signed the
Pretrial Stipulation containing the waiver language, the district comi concluded that the
requirements of Swan were met.
On the other hand, aside from the quoted language of the AB.A Standards for Criminal
Justice included in Swan, the Idaho Court of Appeals very specifically and directly set forth a
requirement "that the Court personally address the defendant" and that such requirement would
"not constitute an undue burden on the courts where this very important right is at issue," State v.
Swan, I 08 Idaho at 966, 703 P.2d at 730.

Though the district comi in this case noted this quote from the Idaho Court of Appeals in
Swan, it did not address this requirement on its merits. It simply picked a side of this conflicting

language without addressing the obvious conflict.
ii. Waiver to be Expressed in Open Court

Clearly we know from Swan that the requirement set f01ih in !.C.R. 23(a) for felony cases
is that a defendant waive a jury trial "by a written waiver executed by the defendant in open
court" more clearly means that the comi personally address the defendant in open court to ensure
that such written waiver is a knowing and voluntary one. The district court in this case did not
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find that the same requirement pertained to the instant matter. There is no reasonable basis for its
refusal to do so.
In misdemeanor cases, I.C.R. 23(6) requires that the waiver of a jury trial be "waived by
the consent of both parties expressed in open court and entered in the minutes." This rule at
worst suggests that whatever is done by the pa1iies to waive a jury trial be expressed in open
court. It suggests at best that "open comi" means that the magistrate comi is present when the
expression of the waiver of the jury trial is made. In this respect, Swan is very consistent and on
point.
The district court failed to consider Swan in conjunction with I.C.R. 23(6). Rule 23(6)
does not provide that expressing a waiver of a jury trial in open comi is one of two alternatives.
Rather, Rule 23(6) and its requirement of a waiver being expressed in open comi is singular.
While it is acknowledged that Rule 23(6) is conflict with the AB.A. Standard quoted in Swan,
Appellant argues that the Idaho Court of Appeals expanded the this standard to also require that a
court address the defendant personally.
This makes sense when the voluminous decisions emphasizing a defendant's
constitutional right to a jury trial and the waiver thereof are considered. The Idaho Court of
Appeals in Swan specifically found that it is this "very impo1iant right" that justifies the
expanded requirement for a comi to personally address a defendant who is making a waiver of
this right.
iii. Appellant Signed the Pretrial Stipulation
To the extent that Appellant signed the Pretrial Stipulation, it ce1iainly appears by the
language of the Stipulation that he waived his right to a jury trial. However, Appellant's
signature alone does not meet the requirement of Swan. Did the Appellant understand his right to
a jury trial? We do not know this as the record is clear he was not "advised by the court of his
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - I 0

right." Instead, Appellant filled out a waiver of Notification of Rights form and the magistrate
merely inquired whether Appellant had any questions about this form at his arraignment. (S.T.,
p. 4). The argument that he knew of his right to a jury trial assumes that he indeed read and
understood the Notification of Rights form. This assumption is not compensated for in the Swan
decision, nor the A.B.A. Standard quoted therein.
Similarly, did Appellant understand that by signing the Pretrial Stipulation he was
waiving his jury trial? The argument that he did assumes that Appellant read and understood the
Pretrial Stipulation form. This assumption is likewise not compensated for in the Swan decision.

iv. Appellant was Never Personally Addressed
The record is clear that Appellant was never personally addressed regarding his waiver of
jury trial by the magistrate court. The magistrate comi was not present at his pretrial conference
where the Pretrial Stipulation was signed by Appellant, defense counsel, and the prosecuting
attorney. (C.R., p. 109). In fact, the magistrate judge never signed the Pretrial Stipulation and
Order fruiher verifying that he was not present at the pretrial conference and did not address
Appellant concerning the waiver. (C.R., p. 27).
The purpose of the requirement in Swan that the court personally address a defendant
waiving a jury trial is borne out in Vasquez. Because of the inviolate nature of the constitutional
right to a jury trial, Swan and Vasquez together illustrate that we must not rely solely upon a
written waiver just as we do not rely upon an agreement of counsel. Rather, the court must
discuss with the defendant his or her right to a trial by jury and ensure that a waiver is knowing
and voluntary.
In Vasquez, the defendant stood with her counsel and the prosecuting attorney in open
court as they stipulated to her waiver of jury trial. She was present but she was silent. In this
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case, Appellant appeared with his counsel at the pretrial conference and signed a document that
referenced a waiver of the jury trial. However, as with Ms. Vasquez, he was silent.
Appellant is urging this Court to hold as a matter of law that in all cases, misdemeanor of
felony, where the pmties seek a waiver of the jury trial, the comt must personally address the
defendant.

B. The First Two Prongs of Perry Are Satisfied
This Court should also be bolstered by the fact that most other jurisdictions hold that a
defective waiver of the right to a jury trial is, in fact, reversible error. See, e.g., Fortune v. United

States, 59 A.3d 949 (D.C. 2013); Jackson v. United States, 498 A.2d 185 (D.C. 1985); State v.
Baker, 170 P.3d 727 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); People v. Ernst, 881 P.2d 298 (Cal. 1994); State v.
Ibey, 352 A.2d 691 (Vt. 1976).
C, The Magistrate Court's Error is Structural
The issue then becomes whether Perry's third prong has been met. In most cases the
Appellant would otherwise be required to establish "that the error affected [his] substantial
rights, meaning (in most instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226,245 P.3d at 978.
However, this Court held in Vasquez that a defendant may be relieved of the burden to
show prejudice because a constitutionally invalid waiver of the right to a jury trial is a structural
defect, and that structural defects automatically satisfy the third prong of Perry. Appellant urges
this Comt to similarly hold in this case.

VI. Conclusion
In criminal cases trial courts must obtain a defendant's consent to waive the jury trial.
This must not come just from counsel. It must come from the defendant himself. Such a waiver
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must be knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Failing to make these findings as to the defendant
personally establishes a structural defect in the proceedings.
These were this Court's recent holdings in Vasquez. They should have made the district
court's decision in this case very straight forward. Vasquez solidifies and clarifies the Idaho
Court of Appeals expansion of the A.B.A. Standard quoted in Swan: when a defendant waives a
jury trial, the court must address personally with the defendant. The magistrate's failure to do so
in this case constitutes a structural defect and is reversible error.
This Court should also be bolstered by the fact that most other jurisdictions hold that a
defective waiver of the right to a jury trial is, in fact, reversible en-or. See, e.g., Fortune v. United
States, 59 A.3d 949 (D.C. 2013); Jackson v. United States, 498 A.2d 185 (D.C. 1985); State v.
Baker, 170 P.3d 727 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); People v. Ernst, 881 P.2d 298 (Cal. 1994); State v.
Ibey, 352 A.2d 691 (Vt. 1976).

Appellant respectfully requests that his conviction in this matter be vacated and that the
case be remanded for furt~roceedings
DATED this

1i
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day of September, 2018.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

......-?I~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this-~
c::::A~ day of September, 2018, I served a true and
con-ect copy of the foregoing document on the following by the method of delivery indicated:
Lawrence Wasden, Esq.
Idaho Attorney General
700 W. State Street, 4th Floor
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
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